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Abstract
It has recently been argued that a non-Bayesian probabilistic version of inference to
the best explanation (IBE*) has a number of advantages over Bayesian conditionalization
(Douven [2013]; Douven and Wenmackers [2017]). We investigate how IBE* could be
generalized to uncertain evidential situations and formulate a novel updating rule IBE**.
We then inspect how it performs in comparison to its Bayesian counterpart, Jeffrey
conditionalization (JC), in a number of simulations where two agents, each updating by
IBE** and JC, respectively, try to detect the bias of a coin while they are only partially
certain what side the coin landed on. We show that IBE** more often prescribes high
probability to the actual bias than JC. We also show that this happens considerably faster,
that IBE** passes higher thresholds for high probability, and that it in general leads to
more accurate probability distributions than JC.
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1 Introduction
It has recently been argued in the literature on belief updating that at least in some cases a
non-Bayesian probabilistic version of inference to the best explanation (IBE*)1 outperforms
Bayesian conditionalization on a number of pragmatic and epistemic counts (Douven [2013];
Douven and Wenmackers [2017]). As IBE* steers away from Bayesian conditionalization,
which arguably leads to rational partial beliefs (see, e.g. Teller [1973]), it has also been
criticized from various angles (e.g. vulnerability to Dutch books, Van Fraassen [1989], pp.
160-70, and potential incoherence, Climenhaga [2017]). Nonetheless, its proponents argue
that its advantages outweigh its potential disadvantages. One aspect of the probabilistic form
of inference to the best explanation that has not yet been addressed, however, is whether it
could govern belief updating in uncertain evidential situations (that is, when
Pr∗(Evidence) < 1)2. If so, how well would such a rule perform against Jeffrey
conditionalization (JC), the almost universally acclaimed generalization of Bayesian
conditionalization to uncertain evidential situations (Jeffrey [1983], ch. 11)? Let us first
illustrate what is at stake. Consider the following example:
James lives in a safe neighborhood. He recently bought a new car. He wants to
see it first thing in the morning, so he parks it below his bedroom window. He
wakes up very early when it is still dark, looks outside and has the impression that
his new car is missing. He is not fully certain of his observation because of the
darkness, but he concludes that his car was probably stolen.
1We denote a specific probabilistic form of inference to the best explanation defended by
Douven and Wenmackers ([2017]) as IBE*, following the authors’ notation.
2Pr∗(·) represents the posterior probability function. Pr(·) represents the prior probability
function.
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Putting aside that James might be overreacting, we can ask ourselves how James came to
this conclusion. One could argue that he inferred it by induction: If a car is missing (as James’
observation suggests) and no one else has the keys, it is usually stolen. However, it seems at
least as likely that he came to his conclusion by inference to the best explanation. He never
had his car stolen before and thefts are very rare in his neighbourhood. For example, he may
have come up with two possible explanations: 1) His car was stolen, 2) His car was towed. To
the best of his knowledge cars are not towed during the night, so the theft provides him the
best explanation. Be that as it may, what we want to stress is that it intuitively seems that
explanatory considerations are also at play when evidence is less than fully certain.
Inference to the best explanation as a principle opens many questions,3 but it is rather
uncontroversial that explanatory considerations influence our everyday reasoning (see
Lombrozo [2012] for a review of empirical evidence). As the above toy example suggests, it
seems that uncertain evidence is not exempt.
The more dividing question is whether explanatory considerations should bear any
normative weight in belief updating in uncertain evidential situations. We argue that at least in
some cases they should. Our argument is simple: We first present simulations of coin bias
detection in low light conditions where the evidence (whether the coin landed heads or tails) is
uncertain. We then show that in the context of these simulations the agent who updates by
IBE**, our proposed generalization of IBE* (described below), much more often becomes
highly confident of the actual bias of the coin after a series of updates than the Bayesian agent
who updates by JC. We also show that IBE** leads to higher probabilities ascribed to the true
hypotheses and to lesser epistemic inaccuracy. That is, at least in the cases we discuss, the
advantages of IBE** do not just outweigh its disadvantages (e.g. vulnerability to Dutch books
because IBE** is non-Bayesian; see Armendt [1980]). Even more, we show that in the
reported cases IBE** outperforms JC because the agent who updates by JC rarely assigns high
3For instance, what is the nature of explanations (Lipton [2004], ch. 2–3), how to compare
the power of competing explanations (Schupbach and Sprenger [2011]), what is the difference
between IBE and induction (Weintraub [2013]) and what if the best explanation is false (the
bad lot objection; Van Fraassen [1989], pp. 142–3).
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probability to the true hypothesis (i.e. the actual bias of the simulated coin).
2 Generalizing IBE* to Uncertain Evidential Situations
How should an explanationist4 update partial beliefs in uncertain evidential situations? Why
do we need IBE**, the generalization of the probabilistic form of IBE we mentioned earlier
(IBE*)? To spell out our proposal we need to first give a more detailed account of IBE*.
Van Fraassen ([1989], ch. 7) was perhaps the first to step towards IBE* (to show that any
particular probabilistic form of IBE is inferior to Bayesian updating). Douven ([2013], 431),
however, provides a more precise definition. That is, when an agent learns E, she needs to
update by:
Pr∗(Hi) =
Pr(Hi)Pr(E|Hi) + f (Hi, E)∑n
j=1(Pr(H j)Pr(E|H j) + f (H j, E))
(IBE*)
where {Hi}i≤n is a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive hypotheses, Pr(·) the prior
and Pr∗(·) the posterior probability function and f a function that assigns a bonus to the
hypothesis (or hypotheses in cases of a tie)5 that provides the best explanation of the evidence.
It can be seen from Equation IBE* that standard Bayesian conditionalization is a special
case of IBE* when there is no bonus (i.e. when the function f assigns 0 to all hypotheses).6
But not all (or even most) of our learning experiences are based on fully certain evidence. Our
experiences are often such that we learn something but we cannot express what we learned
because we are less than fully certain about the evidence.
Neither SC nor IBE* are defined for cases when evidence is uncertain. The standard
Bayesian strategy for belief updating with uncertain evidence is to Jeffrey conditionalize
(Jeffrey [1983]). That is, in most situations when a learning experience shifts agent’s degrees
of belief over a partition of propositions E1, E2, . . . , En from their prior degrees
4The term explanationist is a common shorthand for an agent who favours the hypothesis
that best explains the evidence. In our case, the explanationist denotes the agent who updates
by IBE* when the evidence is fully certain and by IBE** when it is not.
5When more hypotheses best explain the evidence, the bonus is split among them.
6Standard conditionalization is defined as Pr∗(Hi) = Pr(Hi)Pr(E|Hi)/Pr(E).
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Pr(E1),Pr(E2), . . . ,Pr(En) to new degrees Pr∗(E1),Pr∗(E2), . . . ,Pr∗(En), she needs to update
her degree of belief in any proposition Hi by Jeffrey conditionalization (JC):
Pr∗(Hi) =
n∑
k=1
Pr∗(Ek)Pr(Hi|Ek) (JC)
A probabilistic form of IBE for uncertain evidence has, however, not yet been defined. To
formulate such a rule we first note that IBE* is structurally analogous to standard
conditionalization, except for the additional function f that awards bonus points to the
hypothesis that provides the best explanation. We are thus able to similarly formulate IBE**
by adding the explanatory function f to JC, which is a generalization of standard
conditionalization to uncertain evidential situations. An explanationist in an uncertain
evidential situation should, therefore, update by the following rule, which we will call IBE**
(in analogy with IBE*):
Pr∗(Hi) =
m∑
k=1
Pr∗(Ek) Pr(Hi)Pr(Ek|Hi) + f (Hi, Ek)∑n
j=1
(
Pr(H j)Pr(Ek|H j) + f (H j, Ek))
 (IBE**)
where {Hi}i≤n is, again, a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive hypotheses, and
{Ek}k≤m a partition of the sample space E in m parts.
Note that JC is a special case of IBE** when there are no bonuses (i.e. f assigns 0 to all
hypotheses). Further, IBE* is a special case of IBE** when the evidence is fully certain.
Standard (Bayesian) conditionalization is a special case of IBE** when the evidence is fully
certain and there are no bonuses for the best explanation. In other words, IBE** generalizes
standard conditionalization, JC and IBE*.
Let us now revisit the example with James and his car to show how IBE** works in
practice. We can represent the effect of James’ observation as a shift from his partition of prior
probabilities {Pr(parked),Pr(¬parked)}, where Pr(parked) was very high, to a new partition
{Pr∗(parked),Pr∗(¬parked)}, where Pr∗(parked) is low. Theft provides the best explanation of
the uncertain evidence that prompted this shift, so IBE** instructs James to become more
confident that his car was stolen than he would become if he updated in a Bayesian way (by
JC).
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One of the problems with both IBE* and IBE** is that the rules leave undefined the central
function f which awards the bonus points to the best explanation. It should be noted that a
number of competing measures of explanatory power have been proposed (for an overview
and their own proposal, see Schupbach and Sprenger [2011]). The function f could, therefore,
award the bonus to the best explanation after comparing the explanatory power of hypotheses
according to any of these measures or in some other way. However, because the measures
differ, it is possible that different hypotheses could come out as the best explanations
according to different measures.
We believe that this is not a bug but a feature, as the slogan goes. Our standing here is
pluralist: different measures of explanatory power may apply in different contexts. Because of
this, the function f is not precisely specified. We return to this question later.
We also need to address the worry that IBE** may lead to incoherence and expose an agent
to Dutch books because it breaks away from the Bayesian rules for belief updating. As we will
show, this is a price that is well worth paying because in our simulations, JC, the main
Bayesian update rule for uncertain evidential situations, often leads to very inaccurate partial
beliefs after a longer series of updates. That is, neither rule is optimal but we argue that the
disadvantages of JC are much bigger than the disadvantages of IBE** because the supposedly
rational JC more often prescribes the agent to form a high degree of belief in false rather than
true hypotheses.
3 Detecting the Bias of a Coin
Let us now demonstrate that, in at least some cases, IBE** performs much better than JC.
Consider the following scenario (adapted from similar examples in Douven [1999], [2013]):
Ibbie, who (as her name suggests) always updates her partial beliefs by IBE**,
and Jeff, a die-hard JC updater,7 enter a magician’s room with no windows. The
magician shows them 11 coins that are visually indistinguishable but each is
7It is well known that JC is only applicable when the rigidity condition is satisfied, i.e
when Pr∗(H|Ei) = Pr(H|Ei) for all Ei in the evidential partition (Jeffrey [1983], p. 174). Jeff
only updates by JC if this condition is satisfied.
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known to have a different bias to land heads or tails. Specifically, their biases to
land heads range from 0 (always tails) to 1 (always heads) in 0.1 increments. The
biases for tails are converse (i.e. Pr(Tails|Coini) = 1 − Pr(Heads|Coini) for all i).
The coins can only land heads or tails. The magician tells them that he will select
one of the coins and flip it. Their goal is to determine which coin he selected.
In addition to flipping the coin, the magician also tells them that he will adjust the
lighting in the room. Ibbie and Jeff are able to clearly see whether a coin landed
heads or tails if the lights are at the maximum level of brightness but the more the
lights are dimmed, the less certain they become about the outcome of the coin
toss. If the lights are off and the room is pitch black, they think it is just as likely
that the coin actually landed heads as tails (assuming they hear that the coin
landed). That is, their certainty about the outcome is
Pr∗(Heads) = Pr∗(Tails) = 0.5 by the principle of indifference. To simplify,
assume that their certainty about the evidence (heads or tails) is in linear relation
to the level of lighting in the room: Pr∗(Outcome) = (1 + x)/2 where x is the level
of lighting (from 0 to 1; the LIGHT/CERT assumption). Further, assume that they
are both equally certain about the outcome because they are both in the same
room, at nearly the same position and because they are idealized.
The bias detection has two variations: it may end when both are very confident
that any of the coins were selected (i.e. Pr∗(Hi) > T for some hypothesis Hi; T
represents the threshold for high subjective probability) or when they are both
very confident of which coin was selected. It ends after 1500 tosses if it does not
end earlier. How will Ibbie and Jeff perform if they are not allowed to
communicate?
First, note that their evidence is binary in the sense that the coin can only land heads or tails.
If they are certain that the coin landed heads to some degree x, they are, therefore, also 1 − x
certain that it may have landed heads. By way of illustration, suppose that the lighting is at
50% and the coin lands tails. By LIGHT/CERT, they are then 0.75 certain that the coin landed
tails and 0.25 certain that it landed heads. Second, note that the prior probabilities that any of
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H0 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10
Bias: 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Prt=0: 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11 1/11
Figure 1: Coins that may be used, their bias for heads, the corresponding hypotheses and their
prior probability8
the 11 coins with different biases was selected are uniformly distributed over the 11
hypotheses for both agents (see Figure 1). This is because they have no way of knowing which
coin is used (the principle of indifference). This means that they both start with
Prt=0(Hi) = 1/11 for all i.
Further, the agents cannot simply update by standard conditionalization or IBE* because
their evidence is partitioned in the sense that they do not merely learn that the coin landed
heads or tails. Instead, they learn that the coin may have landed heads to some degree x and
tails to degree 1 − x. Let us now adapt the updating rules Ibbie and Jeff use for this particular
scenario.
8The hypotheses are numbered by their bias toward heads. That is, Hi is i/10 biased
toward heads. H0 therefore has no relation to the null hypothesis.
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Jeff updates by the following formula:9
Pr∗(Hi) = Pr∗(Heads)
Pr(Hi)Pr(Heads|Hi)∑11
j=1
(
Pr(H j)Pr(Heads|H j))
+ Pr∗(Tails)
Pr(Hi)Pr(Tails|Hi)∑11
j=1
(
Pr(H j)Pr(Tails|H j)) (JC variant)
Ibbie, on the other hand, awards bonus points to the hypothesis that best explains her
uncertain evidence. She therefore updates in the following way:10
9JC is only appropriate if the rigidity condition is satisfied. That is, when
Pr∗(H|Ek) = Pr(H|Ek) for all k (Jeffrey [1983], p. 174). It is not straightforward to determine
whether the rigidity is satisfied in our scenario. However, Schwan and Stern ([2017]) provide
a convincing causal updating norm based on causal Bayes nets, which is helpful in
determining when it is appropriate to update by JC. Assume that there is a dummy proposition
D that represents the ineffable learning (the observation of the coin landing heads/tails in a
given level of lighting). We can then represent Jeff’s belief network in terms of the following
causal graph where D is a variable representing the values of the dummy proposition (D or
¬D), O represents those of the actual outcome and Bi those of the bias of the coin:
D O Bi
That is, the bias of the coin in question (Bi) influences whether it actually lands heads or tails
(O), which causes the observation (D). In our case, the causal updating norm is satisfied
because the path between D and Bi is d-separated by O for any D.
10Recall that IBE** generalizes IBE*, JC and standard conditionalization. If we simulate
the scenarios where the agents are fully certain about the outcomes (i.e. Pr∗(Outcome) = 1),
and set the explanatory bonus for one agent to 0.1 and 0 to the other, then by using IBE** as
the general rule we replicate the findings about IBE* vs. standard conditionalization reported
in (Douven [2013]).
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Pr∗(Hi) = Pr∗(Heads)
Pr(Hi)Pr(Heads|Hi) + f (Hi,Heads)∑11
j=1
(
Pr(H j)Pr(Heads|H j) + f (H j,Heads))
+ Pr∗(Tails)
Pr(Hi)Pr(Tails|Hi) + f (Hi,Tails)∑11
j=1
(
Pr(H j)Pr(Tails|H j) + f (H j,Tails)) (IBE** variant)
Specifically, the function f assigns a bonus of 0.1 to the hypothesis that best explains the
evidence.11
As we mentioned above, it is not agreed upon how to determine which hypothesis provides
the best explanation. Ibbie, for example, assigns the explanatory bonus by her own method
that works well in this context. Particularly, she uses a modified version of the frequency
measure (mentioned and criticized by Van Fraassen [1989]) to accommodate the function f
for the less than fully certain evidence. The function f thus compares the relative frequencies
of heads or tails as the most likely outcomes (FREQHeads, FREQTails) with the relative
frequency predicted by each hypothesis and awards the closest prediction(s) by assigning a
bonus.12 If two predictions are equally close, the bonus is split in half.
To illustrate: Suppose Ibbie is 0.8 certain that the coin landed heads on the first toss
(Pr∗(Heads) = 0.8). Her Pr∗(Tails) is therefore 0.2. The most likely outcome is that the coin
landed heads because Pr∗(Heads) > 0.5 and Pr∗(Tails) < 0.5. The frequency of heads as the
most likely outcome is then FREQHeads = 1/1, which is exactly as predicted by H10. The
function f , therefore, awards the bonus for providing the best explanation of the most likely
outcome (heads) to H10. On the other hand, tails was not the most likely outcome, so
FREQTails = 0/1 and H10 again receives the bonus as the best explanation of the fact that the
coin did not land tails. That is, f (Hi,Heads) and f (Hi,Tails) both assign the bonus to H10.13
11We follow Douven ([1999], [2013]) with the bonus of 0.1, although it could also be
higher or lower. A systematic investigation is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the
data below (e.g. Table 1, Table 3) shows that the arbitrary 0.1 bonus gives an edge to IBE**.
12The assignment of the bonus thus combines the strengths of frequentism with those of
Bayesianism.
13The function f which awards the explanatory bonus in the described way always awards
the same hypothesis for both parts of agent’s uncertain evidence because
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Now suppose that the most likely sequence of the first four tosses was HTHH where H
stands for heads and T for tails. FREQHeads is then 3/4 (0.75) and H7 and H8 according to
which the coin has the bias 0.7 and 0.8 for heads both get half the bonus on the fourth update
for providing the best explanation of the observed outcomes.
If Ibbie used some other likelihood-based measure of explanatory power, the function f
would assign the bonus to hypotheses at either side of the extremes, that is, the hypotheses that
the coin is fully or almost fully biased toward heads or tails because these hypotheses are the
most likely given the outcome of each single coin toss.14 However, to determine the bias of the
coin, a longer series of outcomes needs to be taken into account, and this is where Ibbie’s
measure (FREQ) shines.
Further, if Ibbie wanted to provide the best explanation of her actual observations (and not
the most likely outcomes), then the function f would lead her astray. To illustrate the point,
suppose the coin lands heads on every toss in the first 10 rounds and she is always 0.8 certain
that it landed heads. The best explanation of her actual observations is then that the coin has
the 0.8 bias for heads and H8 gets the explanatory bonus in each round. This is, however,
obviously wrong because she is not interested in explaining her certainty. What she is
interested in is, instead, how biased the coin actually is and she, therefore, needs to look for
the best explanation of the most likely outcomes.
4 Overall Performance of IBE** vs. JC
With the particularities of Ibbie’s and Jeff’s updating in place, we can now move on to their
actual performance. We developed a computer simulation to test how well they perform in
detecting the bias of a coin in the scenario described above. We ran simulations with a number
of different parameters:
FREQTails = 1 − FREQHeads.
14For example, H10 (the coin is fully biased toward heads) provides the best explanation
according to the measure proposed by Good ([1960]) in all but the second round of the
sequence HTHH. H0 provides the best explanation in the second round when tails is the most
likely outcome.
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• The certainty of the outcome (the level of lighting) may be constant throughout the bias
detection or randomized on every coin toss.
• Any of the 11 coins with different biases may be used.
• The belief updating may stop when the agents’ probability for any of the coins peaks
above the threshold for high probability; or when it peaks above the threshold for the
actually selected coin; or after a preset number of rounds.
• The threshold probability when they settle on any (or the true) hypothesis may vary. The
default threshold probabilities we used were 0.99 (following Douven [2013]) and 0.95
(more on the thresholds in section 6).
We are most interested in knowing how often the agents first assign high probability (over
0.95 or 0.99) to the true hypothesis (true positive), how often they assign high probability to
one of the false hypotheses and how often they remain neutral in the sense that no hypothesis
is assigned high probability after a large number of rounds15 (we call this neutrality). Our
assumption is that were Jeff and Ibbie to actually participate in a similar real-world scenario,
they would become confident that one of the coins was selected when their subjective
probability passes the threshold (0.95 or 0.99).
We ran 55,000 simulations with maximally 1500 rounds of updates in a number of different
settings. Particularly, we ran 1000 simulations for each of the 11 possible coins in 5 different
levels of lighting, so that the agents were either constantly 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 or 0.9 certain about the
outcomes (heads or tails), or that the level of certainty was randomized in every round
(Pr∗(Outcome) was pseudorandomly generated from a uniform distribution in the range of
(0.5, 1)).
At first glance, our overall findings do not look particularly bad for the Jeffreyan agent (see
Table 1). Ibbie became confident of the true hypothesis more often than Jeff, that is in
approximately 50% of the cases, while Jeff only did in 16% or 11% of the cases (depending
15We simulated 1500 rounds because we found that the probabilities assigned to hypotheses
receive very minor changes after so many updates. Further, we also believe that 1500 rounds
of updates is already a very long sequence.
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JC IBE**
Pr∗(Htrue) > 0.95 8789 16% 27,034 49%
Pr∗(Htrue) > 0.99 5951 11% 28,385 52%
Pr∗(H f alse) > 0.95 13,001 24% 16,707 30%
Pr∗(H f alse) > 0.99 9140 17% 11,978 22%
Pr∗(Hi) < 0.95 for all i 33,210 60% 11,259 20%
Pr∗(Hi) < 0.99 for all i 39,909 73% 14,637 27%
Table 1: Number and percentage of simulations where agents assigned probability above
threshold to the true or false hypothesis and when they did not reach the threshold
on the threshold). However, Ibbie’s updating strategy was bolder, so she more often became
very confident of the false hypothesis (in 30% or 22% of the cases depending on the threshold;
compare to Jeff’s 24% or 17% cases). Jeff, on the other hand, appears to be more cautious: if
the evidence is not reliable in the sense that he is not fully certain about it, JC often prescribes
him to stay neutral (i.e. to not assign very high probability to any hypothesis).
However, we believe that this is not the best way to look at our findings. Our epistemic
goals may differ, but there are two generally agreed upon desiderata: (1) to assign high
probability to true hypotheses, and (2) to not assign high probability to false hypotheses. Now
suppose the magician agrees with this principle and awards 1 point to each agent who
becomes confident of the true hypothesis and takes 1 point back if they become confident of
any of the false hypotheses. The magician neither awards nor takes any points for neutrality
(i.e. for not passing the threshold). Ibbie wins with flying colours because Jeff, unlike her,
more often becomes highly confident of the false hypothesis than of the true hypothesis.
A critical reader could raise the objection that Jeff’s neutrality should also be taken into
account. We can accept this objection. But how should neutrality be scored? We believe that
the following two principles are hard to disagree with: (1) it is worse to be neutral than
confident of the true hypothesis, and (2) it is better to be neutral than confident of the false
hypothesis. The points for neutrality should therefore be somewhere in between the points
awarded or taken for high confidence of the true and the false hypotheses.
Depending on our epistemic values, we may take neutrality to be either a virtue or a vice. If
we follow the former, we believe that points should be awarded for neutrality, otherwise we
think the points should be taken. We are pluralists on this topic in the sense that neutrality may
13
Scoring rule T − F 2 × T − 2 × F + N 2 × T − 2 × F − N
Threshold JC IBE** JC IBE** JC IBE**
0.95 -4212 10,327 24,786 31,913 -41,634 9395
0.99 -3189 16,407 33,531 47,451 -46,287 18,177
Table 2: Different scoring rules for neutrality and true/false hypotheses above the threshold
be desirable in some and undesirable in other contexts. In the present context, however, Ibbie
still wins even if neutrality is seen as a virtue. Suppose the magician awards two points when
an agent is confident of the true and takes two points when she is confident of the false
hypothesis. If the magician awards or takes one point when they remain neutral, Jeff still loses
on both counts (Table 2).16
5 Speed of Convergence
As we can see in Table 1, Ibbie assigns high probability to false hypotheses slightly more
often. We believe that this is offset by the fact that she much more often assigns high
probability to the true hypothesis than her Bayesian companion Jeff (see the scoring rules
above; Table 2). However, a very critical reader could still object that assigning high
probability to a false hypothesis is the worst sin a rational agent could commit. In this case, JC
would be vindicated simply because it more often cautiously prescribes lower probabilities to
any hypothesis and, hence, less often leads to high probability for false hypotheses. While we
do not share these views, we can provide further arguments in favour of IBE** over JC.
One such advantage is pragmatic in nature. IBE** converges toward high probability much
faster than JC. Particularly, in our simulations Jeff never passed the threshold for high
probability faster than Ibbie. The difference in the speed was vast. There were only 30
simulations where Ibbie was ’only’ up to 100 updates faster in passing the threshold. In all
other simulations where at least one of them passed the threshold, Ibbie passed the threshold
over 100 updates faster than her companion. Summarising, Jeff passed the threshold
16It is easy to verify that in our simulations Jeff loses unless neutrality is interpreted as a
very valuable virtue, that is, unless two points are awarded/taken for true/false hypotheses
above the threshold and more than 1.33 or 1.55 points are awarded for neutrality (depending
on the threshold).
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JC IBE**
Pr∗(Htrue) > 0.95 9126 (+337) 17% (+0.6%) 41,001 (+13,967) 75% (+25%)
Pr∗(Htrue) > 0.99 5971 (+22) 11% (+0.04%) 38,258 (+11,894) 70% (+22%)
Pr∗(Htrue) < 0.95 45,874 83% 13,999 25%
Pr∗(Htrue) < 0.99 49,029 89% 16,742 30%
Table 3: Number and percentage of simulations where agents assigned probability above
threshold to the true hypothesis and when they failed to do so (improvements over the first
variation – see Table 1 – are marked in parentheses)
probability in fewer cases and when he did, he passed it much slower than Ibbie.
An argument could be made that the speed of convergence toward high probability is
practically important but only so for the true hypothesis. Assigning high probability to a false
hypothesis cannot be praised, be it fast or slow. We agree with this. However, our simulations
suggest that IBE** is also able to answer to this objection.
Suppose Ibbie and Jeff participate in a slightly different scenario of bias detection.
Everything remains unchanged except that the magician only cares about correct guesses. To
illustrate, suppose the coin is 0.7 biased toward heads. After 400 rounds, Ibbie becomes
highly confident that the coin is 0.6 biased toward heads, writes down her answer and passes it
to the magician. He takes note, but the coin tossing continues. After 100 more rounds, Ibbie
changes her mind and becomes highly confident that the coin is actually 0.7 biased toward
heads. The magician takes note. The tossing continues for another 1000 rounds and Jeff still
does not assign high probability to any hypothesis. Because the magician only considers
correct answers, he disregards Ibbie’s first answer and records that she called the correct coin.
He also records that Jeff was not confident about the actually selected coin – he was, after all,
not confident of any coin.
As we can see see in Table 3, Ibbie often corrects her false guess and comes to assign high
probability to the true hypothesis later (compare with the data for the first guesses in Table 1).
Her opponent Jeff, on the other hand, barely improves even if his wrong calls are disregarded.
Specifically, Ibbie now makes approximately 20 – 30% more correct guesses (depending on
the threshold), while Jeff’s correct guesses only increase by less than 1%.
The comparative speed of passing the threshold remains similar to that in the original
example. Ibbie is, again, much faster, although Jeff now overtakes her in a small number of
15
Updates (IBE** − JC) less than -100 -100 to 0 0 0 to 100 more than 100
Pr(Htrue) ≥ 0.95 8 15 752 71 40,155
Pr(Htrue) ≥ 0.99 28 41 133 146 37,910
Table 4: Difference between IBE** and JC in the number of updates needed to pass the thresh-
old for the true hypothesis
simulations. However, when Ibbie is the first to pass the threshold for the true hypothesis (as
in the large majority of the cases), she typically passes the threshold much faster than Jeff: she
is typically over 100 steps faster. Jeff, on the other hand, is typically only up to 100 steps
faster (Table 4).
The speed of convergence toward the threshold can thus be seen as not a merely pragmatic
matter because Ibbie’s bolder updating allows her to often recover from the initially wrong
call. Further, even if both agents become confident of the true hypothesis, the speed advantage
still works in Ibbie’s favour. In a more realistic competitive scenario, Ibbie would be able to
announce her scientific findings faster than Jeff. She would still be faster even if she allowed
herself to keep updating beliefs for a bit longer, because, for example, she
meta-epistemologically observed that IBE** sometimes initially prescribes her to endorse a
false hypothesis.
Nonetheless, an objection could still be raised that in realistic scenarios (e.g. in scientific
research) an agent who assigns very high probability to some hypothesis after a number of
observations will typically stop further investigations (for a similar point about categorical
beliefs, see Harman [1986], pp. 46-50). If we add to this that there are typically no magicians
who already know which hypothesis is true so that they can ignore false calls, we then return
to our initial findings: Ibbie is faster, but also more often endorses the false hypothesis.
We accept this objection. One of the fundamental goals in belief updating is to avoid
assigning high probability to false propositions. However, when all things are considered, we
still come to the conclusion that (1) adopting IBE** more often leads to endorsing the true
hypothesis, and that (2) this happens much faster than with JC.
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6 The Threshold for High Subjective Probability
We assume that Jeff and Ibbie call one of the coins if their subjective probability for that coin
is sufficiently high (see Lewis [1976], p. 303; Jackson [1979], p. 565, but also Douven [2006],
pp. 457–9). We set the default thresholds at 0.95 and 0.99, which seem reasonably very high
(see Douven [2013], p. 433 in support of 0.99). However, high subjective probability is a
vague term, so we also compared how the agents perform when the threshold is lower.
The talk of thresholds for sufficiently high subjective probability is familiar from the
Lockean thesis (Foley [1992]; Hawthorne [2009]).17 We take it that the threshold for high
subjective probability needs to be higher than 0.5.18 0.5 is a rather low threshold but we found
that if the threshold is only slightly lowered (from 0.99 to 0.95), IBE** already leads to many
more cases where the probability for the true hypothesis passes it. JC, on the other hand, in
general requires the threshold to be much lower and even then often fails to pass it for the true
hypothesis. For instance, if the evidence is constantly 0.8 certain and the coin is fully biased,
JC does not even pass the minimum threshold of 0.5 (Figure 3). IBE** is therefore more
robust with respect to different threshold values.
This also shows an interesting change in performance related to thresholds when the
evidence is fully certain (compare Douven [2013]). In this case, the two agents nearly always
pass even the very high threshold of 0.99 regardless of the bias of the coin used in the
simulation.
On the other hand, if the evidence is less than fully certain (like in our simulations) the
thresholds that may be reached get lower. Additionally, the thresholds now also hinge on the
actual bias of the coin used in the simulation.
17We remain largely silent about the Lockean thesis here because we are only addressing
the relation between assertion and high probability.
18If we instead settled on a relational threshold, then an agent could call the coin that is
merely 9.1% probable as long as the other coins are less probable. But this would at the same
time mean that a (rational) agent is 90.9% confident about the negation, that is, that the most
probable coin was not selected (100% − 9.1%). It, therefore, does not make much sense to set
the threshold below 0.5.
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Figure 2: Number of simulations with probability for any hypothesis above threshold (certainty
of outcomes constant at 0.8)
For illustration, consider the simulations where the agent’s certainty about the outcomes
was fixed at 0.8 in every round of updating. As we can see in Figures 2 and 3, Ibbie has
problems passing the higher thresholds (Threshold > 0.9) when the coin is fully or almost
fully biased. Jeff, on the other hand, has problems passing even the minimum threshold of 0.5.
It is interesting to note that the more the coins are biased either toward heads or tails, the
more problematic it is for both agents to assign high probability to any hypothesis. This is
particularly problematic for JC, although IBE** also somewhat demonstrates this trend. This
comes as a bit of a surprise because we intuitively expect the agents to perform better at least
when the coins are fully biased. The sequence of uncertain observations is, after all, simpler
(always somewhat certainly heads/tails). For example, if we limit ourselves to the case of a
coin that always lands heads when the outcomes are 0.8 certain (Figure 4), we can see that Jeff
becomes more confident of the hypotheses that the coin is more biased toward heads than tails.
However, after approximately 15 rounds his expectations of heads and tails stabilize very
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Figure 3: Average number of tosses needed to pass different thresholds (certainty of outcomes
constant at 0.8)
close to 0.8 and 0.2, respectively. That is, Pr(Heads) =
∑11
i=1
(
Pr(Hi)Pr(Heads|Hi)) ≈ 0.8; and
Pr(Tails) ≈ 0.2.
JC updating comes to a halt when the newly learned evidence is in line with prior
expectations. If the expectation is very close to the learned evidence, it similarly only
prescribes minor updates. This is easy to verify. Suppose the expectation of the evidence
matches the certainty of evidence: Pr(Heads) = Pr∗(Heads) = 0.8 and
Pr(Tails) = Pr∗(Tails) = 0.2. Jeff then follows the formula:
Pr∗(Heads)
Pr(Heads|Hi)Pr(Hi)
Pr(Heads)
+ Pr∗(Tails)
Pr(Tails)Pr(Hi)
Pr(Tails)
= Pr(Heads|Hi)Pr(Hi) + Pr(Tails|Hi)Pr(Hi) = Pr(Hi)
for all Hi. Jeff, therefore, stops updating (Figure 4). Ibbie, on the other hand, assigns a small
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Figure 4: Subjective probabilities prescribed by JC when the coin is fully biased toward heads
and the certainty of evidence is constantly at 0.8
bonus to the best explanation and thus manages to reach the threshold of 0.9 in contrast to Jeff
who stays around 0.3.
IBE** thus helps counteract the problem of uncertainty of evidence. Imagine a case where
Jeff and Ibbie are trying to diagnose a patient instead of a biased coin. They both inspect a
number of symptoms. Because they are only partially certain about their observations of the
symptoms (e.g. due to technical limitations of their diagnostic tools), they update their beliefs
according to JC and IBE**. However, Jeff’s findings are inconclusive, while Ibbie on the other
hand identifies the correct disease with high probability. An objection could be raised that
Ibbie might be ascribing high probability to the false hypothesis – but, as we have seen, Jeff
also almost as often ascribes high probability to a false hypothesis in addition to often not
passing the threshold.
Now imagine Jeff telling the patient that she most likely has the disease X, but another
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disease Y is also almost as likely, and there is a number of less likely diseases – however, it is
actually more likely that she has neither of these diseases. This is not very useful because Jeff
is (in this example) not the kind of doctor who entertains a number of what-if counterfactual
scenarios for his own speculative joy. Rather, he needs to be the kind of doctor who comes up
with a conclusive diagnosis and later adapts it if it turns out to be incorrect.
It is also of interest why the agents perform better when the coin is less biased (preferably
fair; see Figure 5). The explanation of this phenomenon goes beyond the scope of this paper
but it is again related to the mechanism of JC, which is structurally so similar to IBE** that
some of its shortcomings are reflected in both rules (though IBE** still performs better). In
short: if prior expectation of heads and tails keeps increasing and decreasing because of the
observations and subsequent updates, then the hypothesis with the closest prediction receives
smaller increases and decreases (corrections) than the others and prevails after a number of
rounds.
On the other hand, if the coin has a stronger bias, there are fewer corrections and the
hypothesis that is the closest to the expectations of evidence has less chance of passing the
threshold. IBE** overcomes these problems to some extent because it favours the hypotheses
that are in line with the sequence of the most likely outcomes. Nonetheless, the more biased
coins still have problems passing the higher thresholds (> 0.9). However, when following JC
means not even passing the 0.5 threshold, IBE is still favoured.
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Figure 5: Subjective probabilities prescribed by JC when the coin is fair (H5) and the certainty
of evidence is constantly at 0.8 in a randomly selected simulation
7 Epistemic Inaccuracy
To counter the last line of defense in favour of JC, we need to also address epistemic
inaccuracy (in the sense of Joyce [1998]; Leitgeb and Pettigrew [2010a]). The defense of JC
has often been based on pragmatic grounds, particularly because it is invulnerable to Dutch
books (Armendt [1980]; Skyrms [1987]). We have demonstrated that this advantage is offset
by a number of problems, for instance, the problem of threshold probabilities for true
hypotheses, slower convergence to the truth and, particularly, frequent assigning of high
probability to false hypotheses (even if the agent’s false calls are disregarded; Table 3).
The latter brings us to the problem of epistemic inaccuracy. In short, epistemic inaccuracy
measures how (in)accurate an agent’s subjective probabilities are in relation to the truth. For
example, if it rains and you are fully certain that it rains (Pr(rain)=1), then your subjective
probability for rain is completely accurate. If you are certain that it does not rain, then it is
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completely inaccurate. But this is just the actual (synchronic) epistemic inaccuracy.
Leitgeb and Pettigrew ([2010b]) prove that standard Bayesian conditionalization minimizes
expected inaccuracy. The authors also show that JC, on the other hand, does not necessarily
minimize the expected inaccuracy. They then propose an alternative update rule instead; let us
call it the Leitgeb-Pettigrew conditionalization (LPC). Levinstein ([2012]), however, shows
that LPC may lead to absurd updates and instead endorses JC because there supposedly is no
better alternative; Levinstein goes on to instead question the inacuraccy scoring measure (the
Brier score). It seems that the question of epistemic inaccuracy of JC is, therefore, at least still
open.
Nonetheless, we can still compute both Brier scores and logarithmic scores and simply
compare how the two updating rules (JC and IBE**) fare in this aspect. Brier scores are a
simple way to measure the accuracy of probability predictions. If the prediction is correct, the
score is 0. If it is false, it increases the further off the prediction is; this is also why it is
otherwise known as the Brier penalty. It originated from meteorology where it was used to
assess the precision of weather predictions.
We use a version of the Brier score for binary events because the coins in our simulations
may only land heads or tails.19 We compute Brier penalties after every belief update with the
following formula:
BS = (1 − Pr(Ht))2 +
10∑
i=1
(
0 − Pr(H f )
)2
(BS)
where Ht represents the true hypothesis (the coin that is actually used in the simulation) and
H f represents the other (false) hypotheses.
It can be seen from the Equation BS that the agent who ascribes higher probability to the
true hypothesis and lower probability to false hypotheses incurs a lower penalty and is,
therefore, more accurate.20
19In the original formulation of Brier ([1950], p. 1), a formula is used that allows for more
than two classes of events happening.
20There are also other scoring rules that may be used to assess the epistemic accuracy but
they are less useful for the present simulations. We mentioned the log score which calculates
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Update nr. 100 250 500 750 1000
IBE** 0.35 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.02
JC 0.77 0.86 0.97 1.03 1.06
Table 5: Average Brier scores in 55,000 simulations of different certainties of evidence and
biases
Brier scores reveal an interesting insight in favour of IBE** in comparison to JC. If we take
into account all 55,000 simulations in different settings, we see that, as the simulations
progress, the Brier penalties for Ibbie on average decrease while Jeff’s increase (Table 5). This
is a clear sign that JC does not minimize epistemic inaccuracy; on the contrary: it leads to ever
higher inaccuracy.
To see exactly how this happens, consider the Brier scores in simulations where the
certainty of evidence changes every time the coin is tossed (Figure 6; suppose the level of
lighting in the room randomly changes all the time). Regardless of the coin that is used in the
simulation, Ibbie sooner or later assigns high probability to the true coin even if she doesn’t
reach the very high levels and the Brier penalties reflect this. Jeff, on the other hand, detects
the true coin if the coin is fair and also moves toward higher probabilities for the true coin if it
is almost fair (bias 0.4 or 0.6). Because the penalties keep increasing for all the other coins,
his average Brier penalties, however, turn out to be much larger than Ibbie’s. This suggests
that JC in our simulations on average prescribes ever more inaccurate subjective probabilities,
while IBE** moves toward higher accuracy.
Note that our argument for lesser epistemic inaccuracy of IBE** in comparison to JC is
based on the initial example introduced in section 3 in which all of the coins had an equal prior
the negative logarithm for the probability of the true hypothesis, LS = − log Pr(Ht). The range
of LS is in [0,∞). However, the agents sometimes assign near-zero probability to the true
hypothesis after a number of rounds and incur a very large penalty. This, in turn, distorts the
average log-penalties incurred over a number of simulations. For example, if an agent assigns
near-zero probability to the true hypothesis in only one of the 1000 simulations, the average
log score of all simulations turns out to be misleadingly high. LS is, therefore, not very
representative in this context. Nonetheless, IBE** also outperforms JC when log scores are
compared.
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Figure 6: Average Brier scores (over 1000 simulations) when the certainty of evidence is ran-
domized in every round
probability of being flipped and the selected coin was flipped many times (up to 1500 times).
The priors were, therefore, uninformative and the evidence was abundant. An argument could
be made that IBE** fared much better than JC because it appears to be an update rule that (a)
gives extra weight to evidence, and (b) less weight to prior probabilities. If this is the case,
then IBE** may only lead to lesser epistemic inaccuracy when both (a) and (b) are met, as
was the case in our simulations. A defender of JC could then argue that JC would turn out to
be a better updating rule in situations when (a) and (b) are not met, and further, that in the
same situations IBE** might lead an agent astray and thus to greater overall inaccuracy.
We can address this worry by considering a variation of our original example. Suppose, for
example, that the coins still have the same biases (i.e. biases toward heads from 0 to 1 in 0.1
increments) except that there are now 100 coins: 50 coins that are 0.5 biased toward heads, 21
coins that are 0.6 biased toward heads, 21 coins that are 0.4 biased toward heads and 1 of each
of the other coins. Further, suppose that both agents, Jeff and Ibbie, are aware of the
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H0 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10
Bias: 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Quantity: 1 1 1 1 21 50 21 1 1 1 1
Prt=0: 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.5 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Figure 7: Coins that may be selected, their bias for heads, their quantity, the corresponding
hypotheses and their prior probability
Update nr. 100 250 500 750 1000
IBE** 0.54 0.20 0.04 0.01 0.005
JC 0.48 0.39 0.36 0.3550 0.3560
Table 6: Average Brier scores in 500,000 simulations of the scenario where prior probabilities
are informative
distribution of coins and their prior probabilities reflect that (see Figure 7). We can now
simulate 100 trials (one with each coin) and inspect how JC and IBE** fare when priors are
informative.21
To do so, we ran 500,000 simulations with 1500 rounds of updates in a number of different
settings. Particularly, we again simulated 5 different levels of lighting, in the sense that the
agents were either constantly 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 or 0.9 certain about their evidence (whether a coin
landed heads or tails), or that the level of their certainty was randomized in every round. We
then ran 50,000 simulations with a fair coin (H5), 21,000 simulations with each of the coins
that are 0.6 and 0.4 biased toward heads (H6 and H4) and 1000 simulations of each of the other
coins in each of the 5 described evidential setups. Our findings show that when priors are
informative JC performs better than when they are not. It leads to lesser overall epistemic
inaccuracy than it did in the original example – its average Brier scores (penalties) for all five
different levels of evidential uncertainty initially decrease and then stabilize around 0.4
(compared to increasing penalties that stabilized around 1 in the original example; Table 5).
IBE**, on the other hand, initially leads to greater epistemic inaccuracy than JC (especially in
the first approximately 50 updates, see Figure 8). This insight is also in line with findings
reported by Douven ([2013], p. 441), where the author reports that an explanationist updating
21We are thankful to an anonymous referee for expressing the worry described in the
previous paragraph and for suggesting this variation of our original example.
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Figure 8: Average Brier scores (over 500,000 simulations) incurred by JC and IBE** given
different levels of evidential uncertainty
JC IBE**
Pr∗(H f alse) > 0.95 15,401 3% 233,882 47%
Pr∗(H f alse) > 0.99 5779 1% 184,437 37%
Table 7: Number and percentage of simulations where agents initially assigned very high prob-
ability to the false hypothesis
by IBE* (a special case of IBE**) reacts to evidence in bolder fashion and is thus often
initially lead astray. However, when the updating continues, IBE** leads to an almost fully
accurate probability distribution (i.e. its Brier penalties converge toward 0). JC, however,
continues to prescribe such belief updates that the agent remains at more or less the same level
of epistemic inaccuracy (see Table 6 and Figure 8).
It is also worth noting that the epistemic accuracy of JC depends on the level of evidential
uncertainty. That is to say that in our simulations of coin bias detection, JC prescribed
epistemically more accurate degrees of belief when the agent was more certain about the
evidence (and vice versa) as we can see in Figure 8. This reveals an interesting insight in
comparison to IBE** whose epistemic performance was not affected by different levels of
evidential uncertainty (note the overlapping scores for IBE** in Figure 8).
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8 Conclusions
We have shown that in cases of uncertain evidence IBE** performs much better than JC for a
number of reasons: it is faster, it is more accurate (at least in the long run), it passes the
thresholds for high probabilities more often and, most importantly, it much more often
prescribes the agent to form high probability in the true hypothesis.
Our crucial finding is that assigning bonus points for the best explanation seems to
counteract the problem of uncertain evidence which is apparently often problematic for JC.
That is to say that even if the agents are able to update their beliefs many times the JC updater
more often assigns very high probability to the false hypothesis than to the true hypothesis.
The IBE** updater, on the other hand, performs much better on both epistemic and pragmatic
counts because she much more often assigns high probability to the true hypothesis (at least
over a large number of updates) and because she is able to assign high probability to the true
hypothesis faster. Additionally, our simulations also suggest that the epistemic performance of
JC (but not that of IBE**) deteriorates with increasing uncertainty of evidence (Figure 8).
This suggests that explanatory considerations also need to be considered in uncertain
evidential situations. IBE** updating offers advantages not only from a practical viewpoint
(e.g. concerning speed) but also on epistemic grounds: Its adoption leads to much more often
assigning high subjective probability to true than false hypotheses; it does, however, more
often initially lead to high probability for the false hypothesis than JC (see Table 1 and
Table 7) because IBE** gives extra weight to evidence.
This indicates that updating by IBE** is particularly successful when evidence is abundant
and when an agent is able to update her degrees of belief many times. IBE**, however, is not
particularly apt as an updating rule if an agent has a limited access to the evidence and, hence,
only updates her degrees of belief on a limited number of occasions. The evidence may be
misleading (in the shorter run), so giving it extra weight may initially lead the agent astray. On
the other hand, IBE** (unlike JC) typically prescribes the agent to assign very high subjective
probability to one of the hypotheses in her hypothesis space relatively fast (see, e.g. Figure 3).
As we have seen (e.g. Table 3), this means that even if the agent may initially be led astray,
she typically ends up assigning very high subjective probability to the true hypothesis. We can
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thus expect IBE** to provide a particularly useful update rule for uncertain evidential
situations in which it is important that an agent clearly identifies one of the hypotheses as the
strongest contender. If, in addition, an agent has access to abundant evidence, we can also
expect IBE** to identify the true hypothesis.
An interesting venue for future research can thus be established with the analysis of how JC
and IBE** perform when they are forced to make decisions on the basis of their inferences.
The idea is that the agents make a choice after reaching some threshold. How often will they
choose to do the right or the wrong thing or withhold from making any decisions? The
performance evaluation of each updating rule would depend on the positive or negative
utilities assigned to right or wrong decisions (or no decisions). These utilities, in turn, depend
upon the context of the scenario being considered – is it a diagnosis that has to be ascribed
(caution is required), or is it a scenario in which any decision for action is better than being
passive (action is required)? Our illustrative scoring (see Table 2) suggests that at least in the
longer run IBE** will generally perform better than JC (but see also Footnote 16). Further
investigations could, however, identify the specific settings which are particularly apt for
IBE** or JC when it comes to decision making. Be that for example in relation to the
risk-benefit of decisions, the thresholds for full-blown decision-making, the role of the size of
explanatory bonuses assigned by function f (for IBE**) or the number of belief updates that
the agents are able to undergo before their decision (or lack thereof).
In summary, our findings indicate that, at least in certain well-specified situations, IBE** is
superior to JC and should be seriously considered.
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